Finding determinants of demographic processes is a highly topical issue in countries with negative demographic trends. Our research was aimed at studying the relationships between fertility and income indicators in Russia. The period under review was 2000 to 2016. To explore the correlation between the time series, we used the methodology of estimating trend deviation. We applied analytical smoothing to model trends, estimating regression models. To assess the strength of relationship between the time series, we analysed correlation between regressions' residuals. The results of our analysis showed no relationship between people's incomes and fertility rates. The research we carried out into time series dynamics did not confirm the results of other studies based on static data. Accordingly, this raises questions about the methodology for analyzing the relationship between dynamic processes with a high volatility of input data. Evidently to receive reliable and stable results, multidimensional analysis methods should be integrated into the study of relationships between dynamic time series, including preliminary multi-dimensional data classification. This will enable carrying out analysis on homogenous territorial or temporal segments, which would be more methodologically sound.
INTRODUCTION
Finding determinants of demographic processes is a highly topical issue in countries with negative demographic trends, including today's Russia. Birthrates in Russia are significantly below the simple reproduction rate. In Soviet times, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) reached this level, starting to decline in the 1980s. In 2000, the TFR was at its lowest at 1.195, just 56.9% of the replacement fertility rate. Despite the positive dynamic of the TFR in Russia from 2001, the pace of change is very slow and the potential for growth has been exhausted. The adverse demographic situation in Russia is exacerbated by low life expectancy and high mortality rates.
Given these factors, studying demographic processes to seek out determinants and develop robust forecasts is highly topical. Fertility is of utmost importance, since it determines natural population growth. However, this demographic process provokes the most vigorous scientific and political debate in Russia -questions related to fertility determinants and ways to regulate it remain unresolved.
The issues of the nature of the relationship between fertility indicators and population income levels have been the subject of scientific research by economists and demographers since the 18th century. The nature of the relationship between fertility and people's wealth has been evaluated with respect to different research subject groups.
The first group compares fertility indicators for territories (countries, regions and so on) with different levels of incomes. For example, figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between GDP levels and TFR in different countries for 2015 (Fertility rate 2017; GDP per capita 2017) . The values on the plot suggest an inverse relationship between these variables. was accompanied by a decline in the average number of children per woman (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2007) . This is shown in Figure 2 , presented in decile groups of women, clustered by income.
Figure 2: Average number of children per woman in groups of women, clustered by income (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2007) Finally, the third group comprises specific territories (countries, regions) whose populations display changing incomes and fertility rates. Recall Adam Smith's words that "poverty… seems even to be favourable to generation" (Smith 1827:33) . However, contemporary researchers are cautious about declaring an adverse relationship between income levels and birth rates (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2007) . This is connected to the fact that, for example, countries with similar economic dynamics may show varying rates of inverse fertility dynamics. Moreover, low fertility is observed in countries with different levels of income across the population.
Stopping short of making sweeping statements about declining fertility due to growing incomes, researchers highlight two reasons for the presumed relationship.
Firstly, as people's incomes grow, potential parents start to assign more value to the quality, rather than quantity, of children. This entails greater investment (money, work, time) in the quality of children's human capital (Lee and Mason 2010; Becker et al. 1990 ). Understanding that their resources are finite, parents are forced to choose between quantity and quality of children and, in the context of a developed economy, choose to improve the latter.
The second reason is related to restrictions that children place upon their parents, first and foremost on mothers. They are connected to, inter alia, the so-called "motherhood wage penalty" -a drop in earnings that follows childbirth. When people's incomes are high, this decline becomes more pronounced (Van Bavel 2010; Begall and Mills 2012) . Additional adverse factors include fewer opportunities for professional selfactualisation and impediments to working mothers' career development. For countries with developed economies and high levels of income, these factors undermine reproductive intentions and consequently lead to a decline in birth rates.
Despite the fact that such reasons may drive declining fertility in high-income countries, incentives that seek to mitigate them are often monetary. In particular, there is an existing stereotype in contemporary Russia, that sufficient material resourcing boosts fertility. This belief led to the introduction of the so-called maternity capital initiative in 2007, which seeks to boost income levels and guarantees for women who decide to have a second child.
As such, despite extensive evidence of a lack of a positive relationship between income and fertility, in Russia, economic factors of life continue to be seen as a key determinant of fertility. This sees the implementation of corresponding demographic policy measures, at a high cost to the state.
On the other hand, we believe that such a clearly mistaken view could hardly have been placed at the heart of Russia's demographic policy. One could thus suppose that the real determinant of fertility is not economic conditions per se, as the way they are perceived by people, for instance, through expectations of future economic and social stability. From this standpoint, maternity capital, as a way to improve fertility, may be viewed not as a means of genuine improvement of material welfare, but attention on the part of the authorities to family matters and an orientation towards family values, which in turn raises people's confidence in the future and creates certain life guarantees.
In light of this, our research was aimed at studying the relationships between fertility and income indicators in Russia, as well as people's subjective assessments of their welfare.
DATA AND METHODS
For our study we used data on annual dynamics for time series of socio-demographic indicators. The data was sourced from World Bank and Russian Federal State Statistics Service resources. The period under review was 2000 to 2016, which was chosen for two reasons: firstly, the availability of corresponding open-source data and secondly, the comparability of indicators as regards the span of the time series.
The analysis covered the following variables: -Total Fertility Rate (TFR). The average number of children that would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age. TFR is a more direct measure of the level of fertility than the crude birth rate, since it refers to births per woman (Total Fertility Rate 2017).
-GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (GDP per capita 2017).
-Consumer confidence index -general, as well as for women and men separately. A generalised index, which is calculated on the basis of five individual indices: past and expected changes to personal material welfare; past and expected changes to the economic -Coefficient of income differentiation. Characterizes the degree of social stratification and is defined as a ratio between the average levels of money income of 10 percent of the population with the highest income and 10 percent of the population with the lowest income (Coefficient Gini 2017).
-Coefficient Gini -index of income inequality. Characterizes the level of deviation of the actual volume of distribution of income of population from the line of their even distribution. The value of coefficient may vary from 0 to 1, and the higher the value of the indicator, the less even is the distribution of income in the society (Coefficient Gini 2017).
We chose these variables as we sought to include both objective and subjective indicators of people's incomes. Objective variables included statistical indicators of levels and variability of income; subjective ones covered sociological indicators connected to people's assessments of the economic situation as a whole and their material welfare in particular. As such, we tested three hypotheses in our research:
1. Birth rates are correlated with people's incomes (in this hypothesis GPD per capita was used as an objective indicator of people's incomes); 2. Birth rates are correlated with people's subjective perceptions as regards their income and material welfare (in this hypothesis the consumer confidence index was used as the subjective measure of welfare levels); 3. Birth rates are correlated with the level of income inequality across the population (in this hypothesis, we used the coefficient of income differentiation and the index of income inequality as fertility determinants).
To explore the correlation between the time series, we used two approaches. The first one is the methodology of estimating trend deviation. We applied analytical smoothing to model trends, estimating regression models for the stated time series. We used Ordinary Least Squares as the method for estimating the unknown parameters in regression models. To assess the strength of correlations between the time series, we used the Pearson correlation (based on a study of correlations between residuals in regression models). The second approach entailed assessing a multiple regression model, where time was one of the explanatory variables. Including the time variable into the model allowed assessing the specificity of the influence of income on the level of fertility, while excluding trend effects.
To test the hypothesis about the possible influence of income on fertility growth we assessed the models and tested for a correlation between the studied variables using synchronized data, and also data about income levels with one and two-year lags. The idea was that fertility changes after a change in income, but not straightaway, with some lag (for example, 1-2 years).
RESULTS
Studying the fertility time series showed that over the course of the considered period, the growth of this indicator was well-approximated by a linear trend. The main results of modelling the total fertility rate trend are shown in tables 1-2 (model 1). As the presented data show, the quality of the approximation for the model is very high with a determination coefficient in excess of 95%. All parameters of the equation are statistically significant and show that between 2000 and 2016 the total fertility rate in Russia grew 0.039 points on average.
Studying GDP per capita dynamics showed that this dynamic is best approximated by a quadratic function. Yet the largest part of the initial data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) fits the ascending arc of the parabola, while the three most recent years (2014) (2015) (2016) showed a slight decrease in Russia's GDP per capita. However we do not consider it appropriate to speak of an established adverse trend toward a decline in people's incomes. The main results of modeling the trend for GDP per capita are shown in tables 1-2 (model 2). Given the growth in both the TFR and income levels over a long period of time (2000 to 2013), we tested the hypothesis of an existing correlation between these two factors in the course of subsequent analysis. During this period, their dynamics were well approximated by a linear trend; hence we used a multiple linear regression model. TFR was the dependent variable in the model, while GDP per capita and time were predictors. The main parameters of the model are shown in tables 3-4 (model 1). As the presented data show, no relationship between TFR and GDP per capita was established -the parameters of the equation were not statistically significant. Similar analysis with account of a possible lag effect also did not confirm any correlation (models 2 and 3 in tables 3-4). An analysis based on a study of the correlation of residuals in regression models also did not uncover any relationship between TFR and GPD per capita in Russia. Pearson correlation coefficients were not high, nor statistically significant (table 5). To test the hypothesis about the possibility that people's subjective perceptions about income and material welfare influence fertility we studied time series for consumer confidence indices. We analysed three indices -general, male and female. The analysis we carried out showed that between 2000 and 2016 these indices did not show a single development trend. Until 2007, consumer confidence grew rather stably, however this gave way to a period of high volatility with a trend toward sharp decline (figure 3). Accordingly, given the uninterrupted growth in TFR throughout this period, the hypothesis about a correlation between fertility and subjective ideas about income levels and material welfare was not confirmed. Consumer confidence index (for men)
followed by a short period of stabilization and then decline. As such, given the uninterrupted growth in TFR throughout the same period, the hypothesis that fertility and income inequality are correlated has not been confirmed.
Figure 4: Dynamics of indicators for income differentiation of the Russian population

DISCUSSION
The results of our analysis showed no relationship between people's incomes and fertility rates. We note that this is a departure from the results of many other studies (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2007; Jones et al. 2011) . We believe there could be a number of reasons behind this. 1. There is considerable differentiation between Russian regions as regards fertility rates and people's incomes. Table 6 presents data from 2016 to illustrate this variability. We note that such differentiation is observed over the entire period we analysed. This highlights an important methodological problem as regards the appropriateness of using average values for analysis. Indeed, given the volatility of input data for income and fertility that characterize the overall situation in the country, they can hardly be considered valid indicators. This in turn may be why similar types of research (fertility and income, fertility and GPD per capita), which uses time series of nationwide indicators as variables, often contradict one another.
One possible way out could be analysis conducted for a single period but for different regions, or for groups of people with different incomes. It is worth noting that the results obtained in different studies of this kind are also rather contradictory. For instance, the aforementioned Maleva and Sinyavskaya noted a negative correlation between income and the number of children for Russian women (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2007) . At the same time, Konig identified that in Hungary high earnings strengthened women's reproductive intentions (whereas in Germany, for example, the correlation was much weaker) (Konig 2012). Moreover, analysis carried out using data from a single period does not lend itself to talking about reliability of results and their stability over time. In the end, the situation for a particular year may be determined by some one-off phenomenon and thus cannot be seen as confirmation of an established causeand-effect relationship. The results of monitoring research, repeated from time to time using a single methodology, could provide such confirmation. However, research of this type is not currently undertaken in Russia.
It may be that given a high differentiation of indicators, it would be more appropriate to study relationships between different socio-economic and demographic factors across similar types of regions, rather than for the country as a whole. These regions could be identified on the basis of, for example, cluster analysis (using Ward's method). Regions may be clustered by income level or TFR, with subsequent time series analysis inside each typified group. We have partly used such an approach toward time series analysis in our previous research (Shubat et al. 2016; Shubat et al. 2017) . The results we obtained, which showed a lack of relationship between fertility and income, define the expedience of differentiating groups beforehand. Each cluster may have its own answer as to whether income is a determinant of fertility for that group of regions.
2. There may be different determinants when birth order is taken into account. For example, research by Wood et al. across seven European countries identified specific economic and institutional factors that particularly influence the birth of second children (Wood et al. 2016) ; a study by Anna Matysiak and Ivet Szalma showed that the same demographic policy measures may have different impact upon the birth of the first or the second child (Matysiak and Szalma 2014) and so on.
We believe that variability in determinants for children of different birth order is even more likely in Russia. We consider that there is a connection with demographic policy measures aimed at stimulating children of a particular birth order. For example, in 2007, Russia introduced financial incentives for second children -maternity capital (Federal law 256-FZ 2006) ; in 2011 and 2012 regions introduced payments for third children, whereas from 2018 there is a significant monthly payment aimed at stimulating the birth of first children (Bill 333958-8 2017) . Index of income inequality
Analysing the relationship between people's incomes and children of different birth order may help to identify a correlation between income and the birth of children of specific order. The same could be fairly said for groups of the population cut by income levels -such correlations may exist in a specific group/ groups by income to be levelled out by other determinants. Unfortunately, this assumption is difficult to verify, as Russian statistics on birth order are not collected.
3. Subjective, rather than objective factors may have a greater influence on fertility. It is known that reproductive behaviour is carried out against a background of certain stereotypes as regards parenthood and childbirth, which influence structural elements and determine social norms on the number of children (Newson 2005) , the approach to parenting (Voroshilova. 2016) , ideas about the advantages and disadvantages of having children for future parents (Bagirova and Shubat 2014) and so on.
Subjective factors may include ideas about family and children that exist in different religious doctrines. Given Russia's multi-confessional landscape, this too may play a significant role. Orthodox Christianity, the most widespread religion in the country, does not declare having and raising children as the goal of marriage. Orthodoxy does not say that parents have to give children a certain upbringing and education, create for them cultural, material and social living conditions that would allow them to flourish in later life. Meanwhile, having children is encouraged in Islam and in the Muslim tradition the role of the mother is a woman's most important, sacred and invested responsibility.
4. A high "cost of parenting", which is traditionally seen as the reason for reduced fertility in developed countries, manifests itself quite peculiarly in Russia. This may be due to the fact that unlike developed countries with a positive correlation between income and education (for example, this was shown by Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios (Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios 2009)), such a correlation began to manifest weakly only in post-Soviet times. As such, the price of parenting for developed countries, «paid» by mothers with a high income and a higher education, is an issue first of all for mothers with a high level of education, which is not always backed by high income. In this case the so-called subjective cost of maternity (unlike the "objective" "so-called mommy tax, the lost lifetime income a woman can expect by becoming a mother" (Crittenden 2010) ). This subjectively perceived cost of motherhood is made up of different components -fewer opportunities for professional self-actualisation, less time for leisure, personal development, external communication and so on. As such, a high "cost of motherhood" in Russia may be a reason for low fertility not for women with high income, but for educated women.
CONCLUSIONS
The research we carried out into time series dynamics did not confirm the results of other studies based on static data on the relationship between fertility and people's incomes. Accordingly, this raises questions about the methodology for analyzing the relationship between dynamic processes with a high volatility of input data. Evidently to receive reliable and stable results, multi-dimensional analysis methods should be integrated into the study of relationships between dynamic time series, including preliminary multidimensional data classification. This will enable carrying out analysis on homogenous territorial or temporal segments, which would be more methodologically sound.
We note that the demographic policy measures that are being currently implemented in Russia are developed based on an assumed relationship between people's incomes and fertility. At the same time, there is no unambiguous confirmation of a cause-and-effect relationship. Moreover, there may be a different, inverse, relationship between these indicators: a large number of children may drive greater professional engagement due to the need to provide for a family. The role of latent factors also cannot be ruled out -for example, the provision of housing, orientation toward family values and so on, which may vary across different groups of the population with different income levels and be connected to fertility rates more than income levels.
We believe there is opportunity to extend our research by adapting the methodology for modelling and carrying out multi-dimensional analysis to study demographic processes in Russia. This is necessary to find substantiated answers to questions about real determinants of fertility in Russia. The search for such determinants is particularly topical today, when experts consider the potential for population growth and its reproductive potential to be exhausted.
